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THE VIOLENCE OF NOSY QUESTIONS
JEANNINE BELL

ABSTRACT

This Essay examines a little-studied aspect of police procedure: police
officers’ unfettered power to ask questions of motorists. The questions officers
ask after they have stopped a car can run the gamut from questions about the
nature of the motorist’s travel plans to nosy personal questions. Such questions
are often intrusive, and drivers report feeling degraded by having to answer
them. This Essay argues that these questions should be regulated because giving
officers complete control over what they ask motorists provides a significant
space for racial discrimination in policing, creates resentment, and encourages
minorities to distrust the police.
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INTRODUCTION
Where are you from? What are you doing here? Where are you headed? Do
you have any weapons on you? Can I take a look inside your car? How long
have you been here? What do you do for a living? These are nosy questions—
questions unrelated to the matter at hand, and the person asking the questions
really does not need to know the answers. Individuals confronted with such
probing inquiries are likely to find them intrusive or embarrassing. Though it is
normally most people’s impetus to resist or deflect such lines of inquiry, the
Supreme Court has empowered one group of individuals to demand responses
to nosy questions—police officers. The law has transformed contemporary
policing into a space where police officers are empowered to ask any citizen all
sorts of nosy questions that are clearly fishing expeditions—entirely unrelated
to the reason for which the individual has been stopped.
Though citizens may find such questions intrusive, Graham v. Connor1
provides a cautionary tale regarding citizens’ abilities to resist such inquiries.
Graham involved the most innocent of victims. Dethorne Graham, a diabetic,
asked his friend William Berry to drive him to a convenience store so he could
purchase orange juice to avert a diabetic reaction.2 The convenience store had a
long line, so Graham elected to leave without purchasing anything. M.S. Connor,
a police officer, saw Graham quickly enter and leave and found this behavior
suspicious. Connor made an investigative stop of Berry’s car. In response to
Connor’s questions about the convenience store, Berry indicated that Graham
was having a “sugar reaction.”3 While Connor was at his car calling for backup,
Graham exited the car, ran around it twice, and sat down on the curb, eventually
fainting. One of the officers who responded cuffed Graham’s hands tightly
behind his back. Several other officers lifted Graham’s prostrate body from
behind, carried him to Berry’s car, and dropped his body face down on the
automobile’s hood.4 In response to Graham’s request that officers look in his
wallet for the diabetic decal he carried, one officer responded, “Shut up!” and
slammed Graham’s face against the car hood.5 Next, Graham was roughly
carried to the back of a police squad car and thrown in the back headfirst. 6 He
was released when officers learned that nothing untoward had occurred at the
convenience store.7
As a result of his encounter with the police, Graham sustained multiple
injuries. His foot was broken, his wrists were cut, his forehead was bruised, and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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he developed longstanding ringing in his ears.8 In response to his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against the officers, the Supreme Court evaluated whether the
officers involved had used excessive force against Graham during the stop.
Ultimately, despite Graham’s injuries and obvious innocence, it was not clear to
the Court that the officers had used unreasonable force. Justice Rehnquist noted
that claims of excessive force must be evaluated using an objective standard
recognizing that officers must make quick, in-the-moment decisions as
situations change.9 As Justice Rehnquist noted, quoting Johnson v. Glick,10 “Not
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” 11 By focusing on the
“evolving situation” that investigatory stops can be and turning a blind eye to
the officers’ unnecessarily cruel behavior toward someone who they had been
told was ill, the Court’s decision in Graham gives law enforcement officers a
substantial grant of discretion. Because of the extraordinary facts in Graham—
a diabetic experiencing insulin shock failed to respond to police and was treated
roughly—one logical extension of Graham is that if a citizen fails to respond to
a police officer’s questions for any reason at all, the police officer can continue
the fishing expedition, even if the citizen is entirely innocent and the officer’s
actions cause physical harm to the citizen.
This Essay questions the wisdom of the Court’s decision to turn a blind eye
to nosy questions. Part I begins with an exploration of officers’ use of these
questions and the rationale behind these fishing expeditions, followed by an
analysis of the doctrinal support for officers’ ability to make such inquiries. This
Essay argues that such questions stem from the ability of police officers to make
investigatory stops. Part II draws attention to the danger of this line of
questioning, arguing that such questions encourage the police to racially
discriminate and to engage in violent behavior. Part III highlights a case in which
the Oregon Supreme Court determined that police officers’ questions during a
traffic stop should be regulated. This Essay concludes with a call to the courts
to help restore trust, preserve citizen dignity, and decrease disruption to police
by curtailing investigatory stops and consequently decreasing (if not eliminating
altogether) the intrusive and embarrassing practice of nosy questions.
I.
A.

COPS’ NOSY QUESTIONS

The Inquiries: What Do Cops Ask?

Violent confrontations can begin with nosy questions. Take for instance the
2015 encounter between Brian Encinia, a white police officer, and Sandra Bland,
a black woman. Encinia stopped Bland for a minor traffic violation. The
exchange below is part of the transcript of Encinia’s initial encounter with
8

Id. at 390.
Id. at 395-97.
10
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), abrogated by Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
11
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted) (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033).
9
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Bland, recorded by the officer’s dash cam, as soon as he approached her car.
Nosy questions are italicized for emphasis.
ENCINIA: Hello ma’am . . . . [T]he reason for your stop is because you
failed to signal the lane change. Do you have your driver’s license and
registration with you? What’s wrong? How long have you been in Texas?
BLAND: Got here just today.
ENCINIA: OK. Do you have a driver’s license? [Pause.] OK, where you
headed to now?12
The first nosy question Encinia asks—”What’s wrong?”—is the least
pernicious. He may have gotten the sense from Bland’s demeanor that something
was wrong and wanted to respond to it. Though it appears not to have been
motivated by a desire to investigate Bland, there are two indications that
Encinia’s question likely wasn’t motivated by concern for her well-being, either.
First, Encinia did not wait for a response before asking an unrelated follow-up
question. Second, following Bland’s nonresponse, Encinia showed little concern
for trying to address any of Bland’s (uncommunicated) potential problems.
Encinia next asks Bland how long she had been in Texas and where she was next
headed. The follow-up is clearly a nosy question of the most intrusive variety—
these questions are entirely unrelated to the reason for the stop, which was a
traffic stop for failure to signal.
Though police may see nosy questions like the ones in Encinia and Bland’s
exchange as harmless and part and parcel of their jobs, another way of viewing
these questions is as purely nosy fishing expeditions for any potential evidence
to indict the citizen. While officers may view such questions as innocuous, these
questions intrude upon “the privacy and personal security of individuals”
because they are entirely disconnected from the reason for the stop.13 In the
example above, Encinia told Bland that the reason for the stop was for failing to
use a turn signal. Questions related to the stop might have been: “Why didn’t
you use your turn signal? Is your turn signal broken?” Furthermore, the two
questions that Encinia did ask—”How long have you been in Texas?” and
“Where you headed to now?”—are personally intrusive.
The mere asking of such questions by a police officer—a government official
with a badge and gun—is sharply reminiscent of the ways in which South

12
Ryan Grim, The Transcript of Sandra Bland’s Arrest Is as Revealing as the Video,
HUFFPOST (July 22, 2015, 11:10 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sandra-bland-arresttranscript_n_55b03a88e4b0a9b94853b1f1 [https://perma.cc/4KL5-ZZEE] (emphases
added).
13
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976), citing United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (involving border patrol stop and questioning of
motorists at designated checkpoint).
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Africa’s apartheid-era policer officers enforced pass laws.14 Additionally, the
timing of Encinia’s questions adds insult to injury. As noted above, Bland was
stopped simply for failing to signal—a very minor violation; nevertheless, she
was asked to respond to a number of unrelated personal questions. 15
Encinia’s questions are not only clearly intrusive and indicative of a lack of
respect for Bland but more importantly such questions also negatively—and
unsurprisingly—shape exchanges between drivers and police officers. The
remainder of Bland’s interaction with Encinia picks up after Encinia went to his
police cruiser for several minutes before returning to Bland’s vehicle:
ENCINIA: OK, ma’am. [Pause.] You OK?
BLAND: I’m waiting on you. This is your job. I’m waiting on you.
When’re you going to let me go?
ENCINIA: I don’t know, you seem really irritated.
BLAND: I am. I really am. I feel like it’s crap what I’m getting a ticket
for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so I
move over and you stop me. So yeah, I am a little irritated, but that doesn’t
stop you from giving me a ticket, so [inaudible] ticket.
ENCINIA: Are you done?16
The exchange continues in this manner for several more minutes with Encinia
eventually asking Bland to put out her cigarette.17 After she refuses to put out
the cigarette, he asks her to step out of her car. When she refuses, he tells her
that he is going to yank her out of the car before reaching inside. A few sentences
later, he tells her that she is under arrest:
ENCINIA: I said get out of the car!
BLAND: Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my —
ENCINIA: I’m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of
here.
BLAND: So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car?
ENCINIA: Get out of the car!
14
From the 1930s through the 1960s, South Africa had an internal passport system
designed to restrict the movement of black South Africans, requiring them to remain in
particular areas. Police officers were empowered to stop citizens at any time and ask for their
passports, and violators of these “pass” laws were subject to arrest and prosecution. See Keith
Shear, At War with the Pass Laws? Reform and the Policing of White Supremacy in 1940s
South Africa, 56 HIST. J. 205, 207 (2013) (describing pass laws that “entitled the police at any
time to demand that Africans show them a properly endorsed document or face arrest, [which]
hindered Africans’ freedom of movement, restricted where they could reside, and tied them
to their white employers, underpinning a system of cheap labour and humiliating subjection”).
15
Grim, supra note 12.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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BLAND: And then you’re going to [crosstalk] me?
ENCINIA: I will light you up! Get out! Now! [Draws stun gun and points
it at Bland.]
....
BLAND: For a fucking failure to signal. My goodness. Y’all are
interesting. Very interesting.
....
BLAND: [Cries.] For a fucking traffic ticket, you are such a pussy. You
are such a pussy.18
Bland was arrested for suspicion of assaulting a public servant. She was found
hanging in her jail cell three days after her arrest.19 Encinia later claimed that he
feared for his personal safety at multiple times during the encounter with
Bland.20 He was fired by the Texas Department of Public Safety for lying on his
report.21
Encinia’s own post hoc description of the stop suggests that the stop had
nothing to do with the reason he provided to Bland. Encinia described the stop
as being based on a hunch that Bland was suspicious.22 Taking together
Encinia’s “hunch” and the nosy questions he asked of Bland raises the question
of whether this stop was really for investigatory purposes. Even if Encinia was
less than forthcoming about his real reason for stopping Bland, the stop was
legally permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the Supreme Court
has held that pretextual stops are constitutional.23
Though it began with a minor traffic violation, the encounter between Bland
and Encinia had tragic consequences.24 In September 2016, Bland’s mother

18

Id.
Id.
20
Brian Collister, Trooper Fired for Sandra Bland Stop: “My Safety Was in Jeopardy,”
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/09/16/trooperfired-sandra-bland-stop-my-safety-was-jeopardy/ [https://perma.cc/2GRZ-VU95].
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
24
Tim Elfrink, ‘Open Up the Case, Period.’: Sandra Bland’s Family Demands Answers
over New Video of Her Arrest, WASH. POST (May 7, 2019, 4:32 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/07/open-up-case-period-sandra-blandsfamily-demands-answers-over-new-video-her-arrest/.
19
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settled a wrongful death lawsuit against the Texas Department of Public Safety
and Waller County for $1.9 million.25
II.
A.

THE DANGER OF NOSY QUESTIONS

Wide Open Spaces for Police Discretion

Nosy questions are the Wild West of constitutional criminal procedure. In
sharp contrast to how the Supreme Court has treated these particular types of
questions, the Court has carefully regulated police officers’ interactions with
citizens in almost all other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Constitution dictates that searches and seizures be reasonable.26 Thus, police
stops are heavily regulated.
Beginning with Terry v. Ohio,27 the Supreme Court has held that police
officers must have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual.28 The Supreme
Court has refined what it means to be stopped and whether an individual has
been officially detained, defining a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes
as the use of “physical force or a show of authority” to restrict a person’s
“freedom of movement.”29 Because the Court has defined the stop as the
intrusion that matters, other interactions that do not rise to the level of a stop are
irrelevant from a constitutional perspective.30 This means that all questions
directed at an individual who has not been “stopped” are fair game, and simply
approaching an individual and asking questions does not mean that this person
has been stopped for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In United States v.
Mendenhall,31 the Supreme Court made clear that police are allowed to
“encounter” individuals and ask them questions.32 In this case, Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agents observed Sylvia Mendenhall at the
Detroit Metropolitan Airport and approached her because they suspected her of

25
Johnathan Silver, Sandra Bland’s Family Settles Wrongful Death Lawsuit, Lawyer Says,
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/09/15/sandrablands-family-settles-wrongful-death-lawsui/ [https://perma.cc/425-Q78V].
26
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28
Id. at 21.
29
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980); see also, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S.
at 19 (rejecting notions that “Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation
upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘fullblown search’”).
30
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
31
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
32
See id. at 553 (“[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police
as a ‘seizure,’ while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would
impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement
practices.”).
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being a drug courier.33 The DEA agents asked for her ticket and identification.
After she surrendered her documents, the agents noted that her ticket and
identification were in different names.34 They asked her to accompany them to
a DEA office for further questioning. In the office, a DEA agent asked to search
Mendenhall’s purse and then asked her to disrobe, but “told her that she had the
right to decline the search if she desired.”35 She balked at the latter request,
saying she had a plane to catch. Agents told Mendenhall that she would be fine
if she had nothing to hide, and so she began to disrobe. Mendenhall eventually
handed over two packets of drugs that were hidden in her undergarments. 36 The
Court ultimately found that because Mendenhall technically retained the right to
disregard the agents’ questions and still had a right to leave throughout the
encounter, the encounter did not rise to a stop—or “seizure”—and thus the line
of questioning did not violate her constitutional rights.37 Only once an individual
is actually “seized” will courts become concerned over questions such as those
seen in Mendenhall. Even then, the courts’ inquiry ignores the content of these
questions unless the questioning impacts how long the citizen is being detained,
though some courts have begun to consider the content of the questions as they
relate to the reason for the stop.38
B.

Discrimination and Discretion

One of the biggest problems with creating a space that allows unfettered
police discretion is the problem of discrimination. There is significant evidence
of police discretion in investigatory stops being aimed at racial and ethnic
minorities.39 Empirically, a rich history of research suggests that police officers
around the country make discriminatory stops based on race. Surveying this
research, social scientists Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald
Haider-Markel describe the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in
investigatory stops throughout the United States in their book, Pulled Over: How
Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship.40 Racial discrimination in police
stops, they noted, has been found in every type of police department:
33

Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 548.
35
Id. at 548-49.
36
Id. at 549.
37
Id.
38
See discussion infra Section III.A.
39
See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 93-96 (2017) (citing data
showing that “African American men are the primary targets of stop-and-frisk policing in
Chicago, Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia”); CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY
& DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CITIZENSHIP 52-73 (2014) (discussing who is stopped by police and why, arguing that officers’
racial biases are “activated by and in the practice of making investigatory stops”).
40
See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 39, at 22.
34
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Numerous studies have found racial disparities in police stops throughout
the country: in the dense multiracial and multiethnic coastal cities of Los
Angeles and New York City, but also the large Midwestern sprawls of
Wichita, Kansas, and St. Louis, Missouri; in progressive, reform-oriented
police departments like those in some of the Kansas City jurisdictions, but
also traditional “political” departments like that of Boston; on major
interstate highways in Maryland and New Jersey but also rural highways
in Louisiana.41
The ubiquity of discrimination suggests that racial disparity in police stops is
inextricably tied to the institution of American policing. No police department
in any area of the country, regardless of the type or size of the department, has
been able to effectively eliminate racial profiling.
Other, more comprehensive analyses of racial disparities in police stops
support this proposition. The Stanford Open Policing Project, originally
launched in 2015, examines possible racial bias in policing using an
interdisciplinary team of statisticians, computer scientists, and journalists. 42
Researchers with the Project filed public records requests in each state to get the
details of each stop carried out by the police over a ten-year period.43 Although
only thirty-one states complied with the request, as of 2017, the Project amassed
a collection of 100 million records.44 The Project’s data showed that officers
elected to search black and Hispanic drivers’ cars on the basis of less evidence
than those of white drivers.45 Like other research showing the pervasiveness of
the problem, the Project noted, “This double standard was widespread, not
confined to any one state or geographic region.”46
This discrimination in policing extends to the use of nosy questions as well.
One of the closest examinations of investigatory stops was performed by Epp
and his colleagues. Their book was based on surveys of more than 2000
individuals in the Kansas City area.47 It focused closely on the interactions that
individuals have with police officers. Epp and his coauthors identified two types
of discretionary stops: traffic-safety stops and investigatory stops. 48 They found
41

Id.
Sharad Goel & Cheryl Phillips, Police Data Suggests Black and Hispanic Drivers Are
Searched More Often than Whites, SLATE (June 19, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://slate.com
/technology/2017/06/statistical-analysis-of-data-from-20-states-suggests-evidence-ofracially-biased-policing.html [https://perma.cc/QM2C-53YV].
43
Id.
44
Id. (“The remaining 19 had a variety of responses: Some didn’t collect the data in
electronic form or didn’t record the race of stopped drivers; others didn’t reply to our requests
for information.”).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 39, at 20.
48
Id. at 14-15.
42
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that, in traffic-safety stops, officers primarily use their discretion to enforce
traffic laws and their racial biases are not triggered.49
Conversely, the purpose and racial distribution of investigatory stops are
different than those of traffic-safety stops. Whereas traffic-safety stops are
triggered by violations of the traffic law, investigatory stops are triggered by an
officer’s suspicion of criminal activity.50 Though traffic-law enforcement may
be offered to a driver (or to a court) as a justification, investigatory stops “are
made not to enforce traffic laws or vehicle codes but to investigate the driver.” 51
Epp and his coauthors find that officers’ racial biases are “activated by and in
the practice of making investigatory stops,” as police target black citizens,
particularly young black men.52 Thus, racial disparities in police stops are
concentrated in investigatory stops.53
Police carry out investigatory stops in an entirely different manner than
traffic-safety stops. Officers are typically brief and circumspect in traffic-safety
stops.54 In investigatory stops, however, officers are rarely succinct. Instead,
they are probing and often “ask questions, look about the car’s interior, prolong
the encounter while looking for anomalies and evidence of wrongdoing, and, if
suspicious, search the vehicle.”55 Officers’ conduct during investigatory stops is
often both physically intrusive and emotionally intrusive; they often make use
of handcuffs and ask intrusive questions.56
Black drivers are not fooled by proffered pretextual traffic-safety
justifications for investigatory stops—Professor Epp and his colleagues’
research reveals that black drivers notice and resent the intrusion.57 The
discriminatory nature of police practices during stops is especially clear when
comparing Epp and his colleagues’ interviews of black drivers and white drivers.
When white drivers were asked about police stops, most described a fairly brief
encounter, ending with either a ticket or a warning. 58 Black drivers, by contrast,
“poured forth story after story of demeaning stops, often rendered in
excruciating detail.”59 For black drivers, the experience of being stopped by the
police is one of lasting humiliation.

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 113.
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III. THE REGULATION OF NOSY QUESTIONS
What might police departments do to ease black citizens’ humiliation during
police stops? This is a difficult question, because nosy questions are part and
parcel of policing practices. Police ask intrusive questions and make
investigatory stops because they are trained to do so.60 Often this behavior goes
unexamined. In the vast majority of stops where nosy questions are asked—
police pull over some 50,000 drivers on a typical day—the driver simply bears
the insult and the indignity of nosy questions.61 In other words, the situation ends
far less tragically than it did in Bland’s case.62
A.

State v. Arreola-Botello

Perhaps because most nosy questions go unexamined, courts generally
consider the intrusion of such questions to be de minimis so long as the
individual has been legally stopped. That doesn’t have to happen. In the Oregon
Supreme Court case State v. Arreola-Botello,63 the court decided to more closely
scrutinize the questions asked by officers.
Arreola-Botello stemmed from the 2015 arrest of Mario Arreola-Botello by
Oregon police officer Eric Faulkner.64 Faulkner arrested Arreola-Botello for
failing to signal a turn. After Faulkner walked to Arreola-Botello’s car, he
demanded that Arreola-Botello surrender his driver’s license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance.65 Arreola-Botello turned over his license
immediately but was unable to produce his registration and proof of insurance
as quickly. While Faulkner waited for the other documents, he asked for consent
to search Arreola-Botello’s car, to which Arreola-Botello responded, “Sure,
okay.”66 As Officer Faulkner looked in the car, he observed a small bundle of
what he believed to be methamphetamines on the car floor. Officer Faulkner
then arrested Arreola-Botello.67
Before trial, Arreola-Botello moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that Faulkner “had violated his constitutional rights by unlawfully expanding the
scope of the lawful traffic stop into matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop,
such as whether [Arreola-Botello] possessed drugs.”68 The trial court rejected
60

Id. (asserting that investigatory stops are planned intrusions).
Goel & Phillips, supra note 42.
62
See supra text accompanying note 19.
63
451 P.3d 939 (Or. 2019) (en banc).
64
Alex Zielinski, A New Ruling by Oregon’s Highest Court Could Curb the Over-Policing
of Black Portlanders, PORTLAND MERCURY (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.portland
mercury.com/news/2019/12/19/27664136/a-new-ruling-by-oregons-highest-court-couldcurb-the-over-policing-of-black-portlanders [https://perma.cc/VWZ3-RD6P].
65
Arreola-Botello, 451 P.3d at 941.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
61
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this argument because it characterized the time when Officer Faulkner was
waiting for registration as an “unavoidable lull” in the traffic stop. 69 As an
unavoidable lull, it was constitutionally invisible and therefore acceptable to the
court. On appeal, Arreola-Botello argued that the trial court should have
suppressed the evidence because Faulkner’s line of questioning—specifically
his request to search Arreola-Botello’s vehicle—”unlawfully expanded the
scope of the traffic stop.”70 The appeals court rejected this argument.71
The Oregon Supreme Court approached the case differently. The court’s
opinion began by noting the statutory and constitutional limitations on an
officer’s authority to investigate unrelated crimes during a traffic stop.72 The key
issue for the court in Arreola-Botello was whether nosy questions—questions
unrelated to the purpose of this stop—could be permitted.73 Several precedential
Oregon decisions touched on these issues. For instance, in State v. Rogers,74
where police questioning was at issue, the state argued that police questioning
unrelated to a traffic stop or a request for consent to search during a traffic stop
was only a de minimis intrusion.75 In another earlier case, State v. Watson,76
while waiting for the driver’s license check during a minor traffic violation stop,
the officer asked the driver whether it was true that he was dealing small amounts
of marijuana and asked for consent to search the vehicle.77 Watson denied that
this was the case, but another officer arrived on the scene and reported an odor
of marijuana, which he believed to be emanating from the car.78 The officer
searched the car based on probable cause and the defendant was arrested.79 The
Oregon Supreme Court ultimately held that investigatory activities have to be
reasonably related to the traffic stop.80
In Arreola-Botello, the Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that the justification
for a traffic stop delineates the lawful bounds of the stop.81 The state argued that
Arreola-Botello’s rights under the Oregon Constitution were not violated
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because the officer’s request for consent to search the defendant’s vehicle didn’t
impose additional restraint beyond the stop itself. 82 The state also argued that,
because a request for consent to search during a legal stop does not further
restrict a defendant’s liberty, such restrictions have no significance. 83 The court
disagreed with both of these lines of reasoning and stated that the salient issue
involved the scope of the officer’s inquiry. Specifically, the court looked at
whether the officer who seized the defendant was limited in the inquiries he
could make during the stop.84
The court insisted that there are limits not only on when a stop may be made
but also on the purpose for which it may be conducted.85 The court explained:
A stop that is reasonable for limited investigatory purpose is not necessarily
reasonable for all purposes, and we see no reason to distinguish between
the activities that law enforcement officers conduct during such a stop and
the questions that they ask; both must be reasonably related to the purpose
that permits the officer to stop an individual in the first place.86
In other words, the officer’s questions in Arreola-Botello were not irrelevant.
They mattered. In insisting on a threshold of reasonableness, the court required
officers to at least in some way tie the questions asked during the stop to the
reason for the stop. The marker of whether a stop was reasonable was not just
the duration of the stop but rather the totality of the circumstances. An
“unavoidable lull” in activities during the stop did not, according to the court,
create an opportunity for the officer to ask unrelated questions. 87
CONCLUSION
Why is it so important to regulate nosy questions as the Oregon Supreme
Court has? First, and perhaps most importantly, nosy questions poison the
relationship between police officers and people of color. We see this in the
degrading interaction between Officer Brian Encinia and Sandra Bland.
Encinia’s investigatory stop, followed by nosy personal questions entirely
unrelated to the reason for the stop, incensed Bland and may have led to less
compliance. Though Bland’s reaction may have been imprudent given the power
imbalance between officer and driver, it is also understandable. It is insulting for
an innocent person to be stopped for a minor traffic violation and then treated as
if they have done something deeply criminal. The encounter between Encinia
and Bland devolved unsurprisingly, given Encinia’s probing, unrelated, nosy
questions.
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We should regulate nosy questions because they are an intrusive affront to
individual dignity and privacy, particularly to racial and ethnic minorities who
have been subjected to discriminatory policing practices. To ask black and
Latino drivers to ignore the insult of discriminatory policing practices simply
adds insult to injury.
The police also have a stake in eliminating nosy questions. As the tragic case
of Sandra Bland demonstrates, an officer’s line of inquiry plays a significant role
in facilitating compliance during a stop and subsequently impacts the level of
trust that black and Latino citizens have in the police. It is far more difficult to
achieve compliance (to say nothing of gaining assistance in fighting crime) if
the people from whom the police are trying to secure cooperation are angered
by their behavior.
In Arreola-Botello, the Oregon Supreme Court offered a route to excise the
practice of nosy questions, ruling that questions asked during the stop must be
reasonably related to the reason for the stop.88 This is not the only solution,
however. One simple way of beginning to restore trust between black and Latino
communities and the police is to regulate the use of investigatory stops. Because
police officers’ suspicions in investigatory stops often lead to unrelated nosy
questions, police officers making fewer investigatory stops are less likely to
engage in unreasonable and unrelated nosy questioning.
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